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PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY
testamentary trust was not to be used exclusively for charitable
purposes, and clearly the deduction should not be allowed.
It is doubtful that the Watson case stands for the proposition
that a gift to a trust to provide retirement benefits for employees
cannot be charitable for federal tax purposes. The deductibility of
such gifts appears to depend upon the circumstances surrounding
the gift, such as the persons benefited by the trust, the nature and
extent of their benefits, the relation between the donor and the
beneficiaries of the trust and any possible advantages accruing to
the donor from the gift to the trust.
WILLIAM S. LOWNDES
Torts-Parent-Child Immunity
In First Union Nat'l Bank v. Hackney' the North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that a parent's common-law immunity to tort
claims brought by his unemancipated minor children' does not apply
to prevent recovery where a wrongful death action is brought by
the administrator of one parent against the estate of the other
parent, for the benefit of the children.
In Hackney the parents of four minor children were killed when
the family car ran off a highway and hit a tree. The administrator
of the mother's estate brought a wrongful death action against the
estate of the father based on his alleged negligence in losing con-
trol of the vehicle. The defendant asserted (1) that the children
were the real parties in interest as plaintiffs since any recovery in
the action would go to them as sole distributees of their mother;
fund was charitable for purposes of the New Jersey Rule Against Perpetui-
ties.
'266 N.C. 17, 145 S.E.2d 352 (1965).
Parent-child immunity to negligence claims of each other was an inno-
vation of American courts. The first precedent for the rule was Hewlett
v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), where the court reasoned that:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and
a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and
the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear
in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal in-juries suffered at the hands of the parent.
Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
"Parental authority" and the "security of the home" were two of the
policy reasons which convinced a majority of the North Carolina court to
adopt the parent-child immunity rule in Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577,
118 S.E. 12 (1923).
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(2) that the children were the real parties defendant as sole legatees
under their father's will, and since the children were both plaintiffs
and defendants in the action, the suit would be futile; and (3) that
the children should not be permitted recovery from the estate of a
parent under North Carolina's wrongful death statute because of
the parent's immunity to negligence claims brought by his unemanci-
pated minor children. This note will be limited primarily to the
impact of Hackney upon the doctrine of parent-child tort immuni-
ty, and the other questions raised by the case will be referred to
only briefly.
In disposing of the first defense, the court held, on the basis of
existing authority, that a wife has the right to sue her husband
and recover damages for personal injuries inflicted by his actionable
negligence ;8 that if such injuries cause her death, her personal repre-
sentative can maintain a wrongful death action against her husband
or his estate;4 and that in such action the persons entitled to the
recovery (here, the children) are not the real parties in interest.5
With respect to defendant's contention that the children were the
real parties in interest as defendants because they were the bene-
ficiaries of their father's estate, the court answered that there was
no showing that any of the general distributable assets of their
father's estate would be required to pay any judgment plaintiff
might recover. It took judicial notice that "automobile liability in-
surance is a fact of present day life"6 and said that absent an allega-
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-10, -10.1 (Supp. 1965); Roberts v. Roberts,
185 N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9 (1923).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (Supp. 1965); King v. Gates, 231 N.C. 537,
57 S.E.2d 765 (1950).
' The court said the children were not the real parties in interest as
plaintiffs within the meaning of that term as used in N.C. GEN. STAT. §
1-57 (1953), that they had no right of action for the death of their mother
under authority of Howell v. Board of Comm'rs, 121 N.C. 362, 28 S.E. 362
(1897), and that the right of action vested in their mother's personal repre-
sentative, Graves v. Welborn, 260 N.C. 688, 133 S.E.2d 761 (1963). In
distinguishing the wrongful death cases of Davenport v. Patrick, 227 N.C.
686, 44 S.E.2d 203 (1947), and In the Matter of Estate of Ives, 248 N.C.
176, 102 S.E.2d 807 (1958), the court said these cases were based on the
proposition that no person will be permitted to profit from his own wrong-
doing. It reasoned that the basic principle on which Davenport and Ives
were decided was inapplicable in the instant case since there was no allega-
tion that the children were in any way responsible for their mother's death.
8266 N.C. at 22, 145 S.E.2d at 357. The court said:
Automobile liability insurance is a fact of present day life which
defendant may not ignore. It is a matter of common knowledge that
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tion that the father did not have liability insurance sufficient to
safeguard the general assets of his estate in the event of a judgment
against the estate, "it does not appear that use of any of the general
distributable assets . . . would be required to pay, in whole or in
part, such judgment."7 Thus the children were not shown to be the
real parties defendant.
In sustaining the striking of the third defense, the court noted
that the present action did not involve the right of an unemanci-
pated minor to sue the parent because of injuries to such child
caused by the parent's actionable negligence. It stated that this ac-
tion was brought by the administrator of the wife's estate to recover
for her wrongful death and therefore the doctrine of parent-child
tort immunity was inapplicable in the context of this case." As an
alternate ground for decision, however, the court said that since
both the mother and father were dead, there was no parent-child
relationship that would be disturbed by the suit.9 "In this factual
situation," the court added, "according to the weight of authority
and sound reason, the immunity doctrine has no application."'"
North Carolina is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions
in refusing to permit tort actions between parents and their un-
emancipated minor children." Parent-child suits are permitted when
millions of car owners purchase automobile liability insurance. G.S. §
20-309 requires every owner of a motor vehicle, as a prerequisite to
the registration thereof to show "proof of financial responsibility"
in the manner prescribed by G.S. Chapter 20, Article 9A.
A liability policy purchased by the husband-father would consti-
tute a valuable asset. During his lifetime, it would protect him in
respect of his personal liability and preserve his general estate from
depletion; and, upon his death, such policy would constitute a valuable
asset of his estate and safeguard the general assets of his estate for
distribution to the beneficiaries.
Id. at 22-23, 145 S.E.2d at 357.
The instant case is one of a very limited number of North Carolina
cases in which the presence of liability insurance was a determinative factor.
Another such case is In the Matter of Estate of Miles, 262 N.C. 647, 138
S.E.2d 487 (1964), where the court ruled that an automobile liability in-
surance policy was enough of an unadministered asset of a decedent's
estate to justify reopening such estate to permit a wrongful death action to
be brought against the administratrix, c.t.a., of the estate.
7 266 N.C. at 23, 145 S.E.2d at 357.8 Id. at 24, 145 S.E.2d at 358.
"Id. at 27, 145 S.E.2d at 360.
0 Ibid.
11 See 3 LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 248 (3d ed. 1963) [here-
inafter cited as LEE].
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the cause of action is based on contract 12 or on a property right"8
but are not permitted when the action is based on a personal injury,
whether such injury was caused by negligence 4 or by a willful or
malicious act.'" The immunity that the parent has from suit by the
minor children in personal injury cases arises from a disability to
sue and not from a lack of violated duty.' 6 The immunity is said
to be cased upon a public policy to protect family harmony and
parental discipline.
1 7
In recent years there has been a growing judicial inclination to
find the immunity doctrine inapplicable where there is no family
relationship, harmony, or parental authority or discipline to be pre-
served.' Until Hackney the North Carolina Supreme Court had
steadfastly adhered to the traditional view,'9 paying little heed to
the maxim that where the reason for a rule ceases, the rule itself
" See 39 AM. JuR. Parties §§ 88-92 (1942); HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE
FAMILY 565 (1952); 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 8.11 (1956); PECK,
PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 124 (3d ed. 1930); PROSSER, TORTS §
101 (3d ed. 1963); 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 267 (1936).
"The court said in Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 586, 118 S.E. 12,
16 (1923) (dictum), "The right of a minor child to bring an action against
its parent in respect to the latter's dealing with its property is unques-
tioned. .. ."
"Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952); Small v.
Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); see Lewis v. Farm Bureau
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 89 S.E.2d 788 (1955); Henson v. Thomas,
231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949); Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 50
S.E.2d 540 (1948) ; Goldsmith v. Samet, 201 N.C. 574, 160 S.E. 835 (1931);
29 N.C.L. REv. 214 (1951); 11 N.C.L. REv. 352 (1933).
"5 There has been a noticeable trend in recent decisions of other juris-
dictions to allow actions for personal injury to a child where such injury
resulted from willful or malicious misconduct, but North Carolina has not
yet joined this trend although inferences of a desire to do so can be
gathered from a number of decisions. See Lewis v. Farm Bureau Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 89 S.E.2d 788 (1955); Redding v. Redding,
235 N.C. 638, 640, 70 S.E.2d 676, 677 (1952); Goldsmith v. Samet, 201
N.C. 574, 160 S.E. 835 (1931). As to the trend in other jurisdictions,
see JACOBS & GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 945
(4th ed. 1961); 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 8.11 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS
§ 101 (2d ed. 1955); McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL.
L. REv. 521, 529-34 (1960); 29 N.C.L. REV. 214 (1951); 35 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 467 (1960); 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 208-09 (1961).
1 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Ati. 905 (1930).
Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965).
Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 427 (1951).
19 See, e.g., Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965), where
the administrator of a mother was not permitted to sue the estate of her
unemancipated minor son for damages for her wrongful death caused by the
son's negligence. Although both mother and son were dead and there was
no family relationship to be disturbed, the immunity doctrine was still held
applicable.
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Hackney was an action by the administrator of a deceased parent
against the estate of a deceased parent, with recovery going to the
children. While it does not fall squarely within any of the cate-
gories outlined, it has implications for classes (2) through (7),
for if Hackney shows an intention by the court to disregard the
immunity rule in all cases where there is no relationship to be given
immunity protection, then immunity should not be a bar to actions
in classes (2) through (7).
Hackney was not an ideal vehicle for the court to use in an-
nouncing an intention to disregard the immunity rule in cases where
there is no relationship to be given immunity protection. It was not
a case of an unemancipated minor suing the estate of a deceased
parent for the parent's negligent injury of the child. Such a case
would have presented the question in a more clean-cut fashion.
Hackney was one step removed. The immunity doctrine was urged
defensively in an attempt to deny recovery to children in a wrong-
ful death suit brought by the administrator of one deceased parent
against the estate of the other. This raised an issue of statutory
construction of the wrongful death statute, which the court resolved
by saying that the immunity doctrine should not be read into the
statute in this fact situation. The fact that Hackney was such a
difficult case in which to crave out an exception to the immunity
rule is perhaps an indication of the court's desire to apply the excep-
tion across the board, in all cases where there is no relationship to
be protected. However, this interpretation may be too broad, since
the court in Hackney did not indicate disfavor for any of its earlier
decisions where the immunity doctrine was applied even though
there was no relationship to be protected.2"
There also remains to be resolved the impact of Hackney upon
a line of decisions holding that the administrator of an unemanci-
pated minor child killed by his parent's negligence has no cause of
action against the parent for wrongful death.27 Hackney logically
points the way to overturning this line of decisions, since the same
" Among its earlier decisions was one decided only eleven months before
Hackney, the case of Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965).
The court there held that the administrator of a mother may not sue the
estate of her unemancipated minor son for her wrongful death caused by
the son's negligence.
27 Capps v. Smith, 263 N.C. 120, 139 S.E.2d 19 (1964); Lewis v. Farm
Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 89 S.E.2d 788 (1955); Gold-
smith v. Samet, 201 N.C. 574, 160 S.E. 835 (1931).
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should cease. In Hackney, however, the court took an important
first step toward the modern approach. The court examined cases
from jurisdictions that have taken a new approach to the problem,
found their logic convincing, and held that since the policy reasons
on which the immunity doctrine rests did not apply to the factual
situation under consideration in Hackney, the immunity doctrine
itself should not apply. Authorities which the court found to be
persuasive include decisions from Tennessee,20 New Hampshire,2
Missouri,2 New Jersey,2 3 Pennsylvania,24 and Louisiana.25
Before Hackney, the parent's immunity from negligence actions
brought by his children conceivably could have extended to the fol-
lowing classes of cases: (1) actions by a living child against a
living parent; (2) actions by a living child against the estate of a
deceased parent; (3) survival actions by the administrator of a
deceased child against a living parent; (4) survival actions by the
administrator of a deceased child against the estate of a deceased
parent; (5) wrongful death actions by the administrator of a de-
ceased child against a living parent; (6) wrongful death actions
by the administrator of a deceased child against the estate of a
deceased parent; and (7) actions by a child against a divorced
parent, or against a parent whose own action has caused a break-
down of the family unit.
20 Brown v. Selby, 206 Tenn. 71, 332 S.W.2d 166 (1960), where the
court said the immunity rule is based solely upon the public policy of
preserving domestic peace and tranquility in the family, and since the father
in the case at hand had destroyed that peace by murdering the mother,
the immunity rule should not be applied.
21 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930), where the court
said the immunity exists only where a suit might disturb the family relations.
22 Brennecki v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960), where the court
said:
The doctrine of intrafamily immunity from such suits expires upon
the death of the person protected and does not extend to the decedent's
estate for the reason that death terminates the family relationship
and there is no longer in existence a relationship within the reason-
able contemplation of the doctrine.
Id. at 73.
2 Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (1962), where the
court said, "It is self-evident that if the family relationship no longer
exists, having been dissolved by death, then the public policy consideration
which supports the rule of immunity likewise no longer exists." Id. at 297,
176 A.2d at 819.
2, Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954), holding that the
immunity of a living parent from suit by an unemancipated child was a
personal defense that died with the father.
2" Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935).
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reason for not reading the immunity into the wrongful death statute
in Hackney could have been applied there. In none of these cases
was there a family relationship that would have been harmed, and
the only thing that prevented recovery was a literal and seemingly
erroneous interpretation of North Carolina's wrongful death statute,
which in pertinent part provides:
When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act,
neglect or default of another, such as would, if the injured party
had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages therefor,
the person or corporation that would have been so liable.., shall
be liable to an action for damages, to be brought by the executor,
administrator or collector of the decedent .... 28
The court has denied recovery in this line of cases by reading
the parent-child immunity doctrine into the wrongful death statute,
saying that the child could not have maintained a suit against its
parent had it lived and therefore the terms of the wrongful death
statute preclude recovery.2 The court would not be varying the
terms or intent of the statute by applying its newly created exception
to the immunity rule in cases where the child was killed by the
parent's negligence. North Carolina's wrongful death statute was
enacted twenty-two years before the doctrine of parent-child tort
immunity came into existence'0 and fifty-four years before North
Carolina judicially adopted the immunity." It is a fundamental ten-
et of statutory construction that every statute is to be interpreted in
the light of the common law as it was understood at the time of its
enactment.3 2 At the time of this statute's enactment there was no
parent-child tort immunity to prevent a child from suing its parent.
Thus the emphasized portion of the statute quoted above did not
28N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (Supp. 1965). (Emphasis added.)
= See cases cited note 27 supra.
"North Carolina's wrongful death statute was enacted by the General
Assembly of 1868-69. N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 113, §§ 70-72 (1869). It was
a successor to England's Lord Campbell's Act, which in 1846 created the
first statutory right of action for wrongful death. The Fatal Accidents Act,
1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, §§ 1-6. The doctrine of parent-child tort immunity
came into existence twenty-two years after passage of North Carolina's
wrongful death act in the case of Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885(1891). See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930), for
research indicating there was no such immunity prior to Hewlett v. George.
" North Carolina adopted the immunity doctrine in Small v. Morrison,
185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
" State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 31 S.E.2d 858 (1944); State v. Mitchell,
202 N.C. 439, 163 S.E. 581 (1932).
11751966]
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operate at the time of its enactment to prevent the administrator of
a child from suing for the child's wrongful death and should not
operate in such a manner now, especially if the court is not going
to apply the immunity rule wherever there is no longer any reason
for its application. It still remains to be seen, however, whether the
court will logically extend Hackney to overturn this line of decisions.
A number of writers have urged that either the courts or the
legislatures of the several states should abolish parent-child tort
immunity33 in light of "the ever-increasing criticism of the general
rule' 34 and the growing number of exceptions to it. Examining
the genesis of the rule in 1930, Chief Justice Peaslee of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court said the immunity has "not infrequent-
ly been advocated with rhetoric rather than by reason"8 during
the course of its evolution. Certainly "family harmony" alone is
not an adequate reason for permitting a wrong without a remedy in
the parent-child negligence area.
North Carolina was one of the leaders in abolishment of hus-
band-wife tort immunity.3 6 While founded on a different theory,87
this immunity was also supported by the same "family harmony"
argument that is said to be an adequate ground for retaining the
parent-child immunity. No family disharmony of serious propor-
tion has resulted from abolishment of the former immunity. There
is nothing to prevent one minor child from suing his minor brother
or sister in tort.38 Yet surely as much family disharmony would
result from this type of action as would result from a suit by a
child against a parent. The same "family disharmony" argument
could be used to support a rule forbidding suits between parent and
child in respect to contract and property rights, but North Caro-
lina and the majority of jurisdictions permit such suits. It has
been argued that permitting children to maintain suits against their
parents where liability insurance is involved will lead to wholesale
collusion and fraud.3 9 However, the same argument could be made
8 See 3 LEE § 248 n.232; 43 N.C.L. Rav. 932 (1965).
"3 LEE § 248, at 177.
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 354, 150 At. 905, 906 (1930).
"See 2 LEE § 211.
'
T Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955). "At common law, a husband and
wife were one, and that one was the husband; a tort by one spouse against
the person or character of the other gave rise to no cause of action in
favor of the injured spouse." Id. at 634.
" See 3 LEE § 248, at 178.
"See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 436 n.7 (1951).
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with respect to actions between husband and wife; yet these actions
are permitted.4" In short, the present immunity rule and its excep-
tions result in cases difficult to determine with any degree of fair-
ness and lead in many cases to injustice. It has been suggested that
the simplest way to abolish parent-child tort immunity is to enact
a statute doing so. At least one writer has gone so far as to
suggest that legislation is the only way.4 However, it should be
remembered that the immunity was a creature of the courts,42 and
what the courts have created they can destroy.
TH OMAS J. BOLCH
Workmen's Compensation-Average Weekly Wage-Combination of
Wages
Barnhardt had been working during the days for National Cash
Register Company, at an average weekly wage of 68 dollars, and
during the evenings for Yellow Cab Company, at an average week-
ly wage of 26 dollars. He sustained a compensable injury while
working for Yellow Cab. In Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co.' the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that it was error for the Work-
men's Compensation Commission to have combined the wages earned
from both employers in fixing the compensation at 37.50 dollars per
week (the maximum) and that the compensation should have been
limited to 16.14 dollars per week, sixty per cent of the average
wage earned from Yellow Cab.
North Carolina's Workmen's Compensation Act provides that
an employee is to be compensated for sixty per cent of his average
weekly wage, up to a maximum of 37.50 dollars per week, for a
period not exceeding 400 weeks.2 Average weekly wage is defined
as the average of the employee's wages earned over a period of a
year in the employment in which he was working at the time of
the injury.3 When the employment is casual or for a shorter period
than a year, the statute authorizes consideration of the average
weekly wage of employees in the same class of employment or an
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 354, 150 At. 905, 906 (1930).
41 See Castellucci v. Castellucci, 188 A.2d 467, 469 (R.I. 1963).
42 See note 2 supra.
'266 N.C. 419, 146 S.E.2d 479 (1966).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (1965).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(5) (1965).
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